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In 1988, George Herbert Walker Bush's campaign advertisements claimed 
his opponent, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, was responsible 
for loosing hundreds of first
whereupon one of the furloughed convicts slashed a Maryland man and 
raped his fiancé. America, the Bush ad charged, could not afford to risk 
such leadership. The ads and the news coverage they spawned becam
central part of the campaign narrative, abetted by Bush's frequent 
retellings of the tale on the campaign trail. The evidence of the lasting 
effect of the ads could be seen in the spike in references in the 
Congressional Record
perhaps in Bush's own ascendancy to the White House. The ad's claims, 
however, were largely fraudulent. As Kathleen Hall Jamieson noted, only 
one furloughed inmate went on to commit other crimes such as rape, not 
the 268 suggested by 
prison furlough program had been initiated not by Dukakis, but by a 
Republican predecessor more than a decade earlier. Indeed Dukakis 
eventually abolished the furlough program after extensive reporting 
incident in question. Moreover the federal government, under the 
leadership of President Reagan and Vice President Bush, operated exactly 
the same kind of program. As a Dukakis ad pointed out, under that 
program, a convict escaped from a federal cor
raped and killed a pregnant mother of two. The Massachusetts furloughs 
were not "weekend" passes but good for only 36 hours; even the name of 
the Massachusetts convict was twisted by Bush campaign spin: William J. 
Horton Jr. became "Willie Horton," the man Bush media consultant Lee 
Atwater promised to make "Michael Dukakis's running mate" (
1992). Crime rates tend to ebb and flow, often impervious to public 
policy; but under Dukakis, Massachu
rates of any industrialized state in the nation.
The Birth of the Ad Watch
It was the media's complicity in the Bush tactics, however, that prompted 
perhaps the most significant and sustained critiques ever of press 
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-degree murderers on "weekend" passes, 
 to "prison furloughs" the following year, and 
the ad's juxtaposition of graphics and narrative. The 
rectional halfway house and 
Jamieson 
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coverage of political campaigns and advertising in particular. Notably 
David Broder, one of the deans of the Washington Press corps, called for a 
greater effort to police the content of political spots (Broder 1990), a 
position also taken by academics including Jamieson and Darrell West 
(1992). The result was the growth of "ad watch" journalism (Ad Watch 
2.0; see Richardson 2002). The 1992 presidential campaign produced a 
dramatic up-tick in media attention to campaign spots, including many 
specifically employing the visual grammar developed by Jamieson and 
her research team to allow reporters to critique an ad without reinforcing 
it's claims. 
The initial results were encouraging. Candidates began to submit 
documentation to back up the claims made in their ads, and the ads 
themselves often included onscreen factual citations (West 2005:84). One 
television reporter argued that ad watch journalism was "the primary 
reason why no Willie Horton ads or their cousins have appeared in (the 
1992) campaign. Our coverage is keeping the bastards honest" (Jamieson 
and Campbell 2001:332). Howard Kurtz of the Washington Post 
described the ad watches as "a great step forward for democracy," and a 
public opinion survey showed that 68 percent of those who responded 
found ad watches "somewhat helpful" or "very helpful" (West 2005:85). 
The Backlash: Let Lying Dogs Sleep 
Soon, however, the bloom would fall from the ad watch rose. In 1996, 
while print ad watches continued, television ad watches almost vanished. 
Network news producers claimed the Clinton-Dole contest was not close 
enough to justify the effort (Jamieson and Campbell 2001:332). Perhaps 
further fueling the turn away from the ad watch were the results of a high 
profile study by political scientists Shanto Iyengar and Stephen 
Ansolabehere that found ad watches almost wholly ineffective, even 
leading viewers to support candidates whose ads were being critiqued 
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; 1996). These findings prompted a 
reassessment of the ad watch project by prominent journalists, 
academics, and even some of the original proponents of the technique. 
Writing in the New York Times Magazine, Max Frankel asked 
"whether it's worth chasing down the lies and slanders in the candidates' 
TV commercials," noting that "(o)ur Ad Watch campaigns seem to be 
giving wide circulation to 30-second mendacities that the campaigns have 
paid us to air only once or twice." Specifically citing Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar's work, he continued, "(t)he now-routine policing of TV 
commercials, it turns out, often compounds the damage that those ads 
inflict on our democracy. We are being urged to pass up the temptations 
of testing the ads for truth, to let lying dogs sleep" (Frankel 1996:18). 
Washington Post columnist David Broder, an early advocate of the ad 
patrol, stated that the Ansolabehere and Iyengar findings "shatter some of 
my preconceptions," and that the evidence showed ad watches "appear 
only to reinforce the negative consequences. They 'clearly backfired''' 
(Broder 1996). 
A host of other scholarly efforts produced at best mixed results on the 
efficacy of ad watches, some supporting claims of a "boomerang" or 
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"backlash" effect (where the criticized ad sponsor actually gained support) 
(Pfau and Louden 1994; O'Sullivan and Geiger 1995; McKinnon and Kaid 
1999; Leshner 2001). While West found an increase in ad watches in the 
New York Times and Washington Post in 2000 (compared to 1996), by 
2004 the ad watch had become "an endangered species" (West 2005:88; 
see also Kaid, Tedesco and McKinnon 1996, Bennett 1997 and Weaver 
Lariscy and Tinkham 1999 on the decline of the ad watch in the 1990s). 
The Ad Watch Endures 
Perhaps, though, as with Mr. Twain, the rumors of the demise of the ad 
watch are greatly exaggerated. Even while on West's endangered species 
list (grounded in print and broadcast journalism), the ad watch seemingly 
flourished online and in other corners of the media environment during 
the 2004 campaign. Prominent ad watch sites included the Ad Watch 
component of PBS's "Politics 101," the Campaign Ad Watch section of 
MSNBC's "Decision 2004" web site, and perhaps the mother of all ad 
watch efforts, Factcheck.org (2004 features remain available in the site's 
archive). Separately, a group called "Best Practices in Journalism" 
sponsored over 20 workshops exploring different angles in election 
coverage including ad watches between 2000 and 2004. Though no 
longer active, group's web site features video clips of effective ad watch 
segments and tips for TV stations and reporters considering producing ad 
watch features. Still more ad watching occurred on independent web sites 
and blogs (see for example "Wonkette's" weblog on attack ads). All of this 
activity, moreover, pre-dated the existence of video sharing web sites such 
as YouTube and the anti-Bush video blog Political Zing. An Annenberg 
Public Policy Center study found a sharp increase in adwatch stories on 
TV during the mid-2000s compared to a decade earlier (Papper 2007).  
In 2008, Factcheck.org was joined in cyberspace by Politifact.com, a 
project of the St. Petersburg Times and Congressional Quarterly 
(featuring an "attack file" and a "truth-o-meter") and by "The Fact 
Checker" (from Washington Post blogger Michael Dobbs). Comedy 
Central’s Indecision website frequently targets campaign spots as well 
(see also Painter and Hodges 2010 on Jon Stewart’s role in holding the 
news media accountable). 
In short, it is likely that future campaigns will see more, far more "ad 
watching" behavior by professionals and amateurs alike. The challenge in 
"building a better ad watch," therefore, no longer lies in finding 
appropriate venues for the task. Instead the key challenges are in the task 
itself, in effectively countering suspect elements of campaign 
commercials. Jamieson's pioneering efforts produced a "visual grammar" 
for ad critiques. Yet the grammar itself was a visual way of addressing the 
verbal and textual claims of ads. Still undeveloped are the tools and 
techniques that can address the audiovisual elements of ads. The role 
such elements play in how ads work may be substantial. Research 
emanating from the University of Iowa has spotlighted the way campaign 
ads rely upon the audiovisual conventions of popular culture and the 
recognizable genres from whence they spring to communicate both 
narrative and emotion (see for example Nelson and Boynton 1997; 
Richardson 2003). Michigan's Ted Brader found that emotionally 
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uplifting music produced dramatic effects, increasing the likelihood of 
voting in viewers of his experimental campaign spots (Brader 2006). 
While ad watchers may have warmed to the task of truth-testing, even 
more challenging may be the need to assess the claims of character and 
characterization made in campaign communication. Just as audiovisuals 
often fly under the ad watch radar, so too do claims of character--even 
while such claims may be far more salient to ordinary citizens than the 
minutiae of policy that serves as the grist for the fact checkers’ mill. 
The present project is designed to explore the issues confronting the 
next generation of ad watches. It unfolds in three parts: first, an analysis 
of the limits and liabilities of extant journalistic approaches to campaign 
advertising, including the ad watch format. Second, demonstration of a 
handful of techniques that can aid those seeking to counter the 
questionable claims, assertions and implicit inferences of dubious 
political commercials. Finally, some brief ruminations on the future of the 
ad watch. 
Ads as News: Counterargument or 
Reinforcement? 
The scholarly research that began to cast doubt on the effectiveness of ad 
watch journalism highlighted the difficulty news producers have in 
attempting to counter the questionable claims and inferences in ads 
without unintentionally reinforcing the very charges they seek to rebut. 
Unfortunately, reporters, producers, and even researchers may have 
drawn the wrong conclusions from that scholarly evidence. For all the 
findings of the failure of ad watches, few have paused to consider the 
alternatives. The academic work was typically designed to measure 
whether ad watches worked in supplanting the claims of ads with the 
factual judgments of reporters. What they did not do was to contrast a 
world (more than just a broadcast) without ad watches to one with them. 
While one study that did contrast exposure to ad watches and exposure to 
the ads themselves found ad watches magnify the ad's messages, that 
work, like much of the research on ad watches, did not feature an ad 
watch pointing to major flaws in the ad (McKinnon and Kaid 1999), or 
fundamentally address the ad's audiovisual elements. In short, in testing 
the efficacy of ad watches, researchers, relying largely on extant ad 
watches, have used poor exemplars of the breed. They have focused 
narrowly, perhaps overlooking the broader implications of the ad watch 
movement. 
While there can be little doubt that it is extremely difficult for 
journalists to counter the claims of campaign ads, academic efforts to 
assess the efficacy of the ad watch also have several drawbacks that have 
largely escaped scrutiny, even as the studies' conclusions may have 
influenced how journalists approach ads. None of the prominent analyses 
questioning the effectiveness of ad watch journalism involved random 
samples of Americans, or even of the residents of a given state. Several 
involved samples of undergraduates in communications-related courses. 
Many sought evidence that viewers would be repelled from a sponsor of 
an ad being analyzed when the actual ad analysis was not particularly 
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critical (the closing line to the Brooks Jackson ad watch in the Iyengar 
and Ansolabehere study began, "Nothing really false here ...") (Jamieson 
and Cappella 1997; see also Richardson 2003:99-100). In their detailed 
response to the Ansolabehere and Iyengar work, Jamieson and Cappella 
conclude, "Ansolabehere and Iyengar's descriptions of the tested ad 
watches are themselves misleading . . . No boomerang. No backlash" 
(Jamieson and Cappella 1997:19). All had to struggle with vexing issues of 
internal and external validity. Despite elaborate research designs aimed at 
simulating actual news in an on-going campaign environment, none truly 
comes close to replicating political behavior "in the field." 
More broadly, ad watch research has implicitly adopted a primitive 
model of voting wherein all survey respondents are created equal, as are 
all survey responses. Marketers and political consultants now know that 
some respondents are more influential than others and have an outsized 
role in shaping the behavior of their peers. That is, the role of the reporter 
is to get information before the public. Individual members of the public 
naturally differ in their ability to parse information and to impart 
information to others. Moreover, the use of "online processing," (Hastie 
and Park 1986) where evaluations are made but the details supporting 
those judgments are discarded, may explain why less educated 
respondents may pick up the tone of an ad watch but do not retrieve 
specific information about it when probed by investigators, producing 
confounding effects for researchers (Jamieson and Cappella 1997:20). 
In sum, it may be quite enough for journalists to make critical 
information available, whether or not experiments suggest that most 
respondents process that information properly. Once the information is 
available, an entire infrastructure of political communication comes into 
play, including parties and activists. The more important point is that 
there is a role for scholars, journalists and other observers to play in 
assessing the veracity of campaign communication, even absent 
scientifically compelling research findings on the efficacy of the effort. 
Scholarly work is grounded in professional norms but also seeks to serve 
broader public purposes. In that larger public sphere, the calling is deeper 
and the criteria for judgment more evasive. Yet, while truth is elusive, the 
quest for truth itself becomes instructive. Put another way, the quest for a 
truer campaign discourse need not be tethered to the survey respondent 
and the social scientist's t-test. As in so many public matters, action must 
proceed in the murky absence of complete information; time and again 
political behavior defies even the most sophisticated statistical modeling. 
The inadequacy of the disciplinary tools of scholarship does not eradicate 
the need for a more enlightened approach to assessing the honesty and 
integrity of the political campaigns at the core of electoral democracy. 
Noting the high level of misinformation among voters in a post-election 
survey following the 2008 campaign, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Brooks 
Jackson of FactCheck.org reflected, "... are we discouraged that our efforts 
didn’t prevent this? Not at all. If we hadn’t tried, it might have been 
worse" (FactCheck.org 2008a). 
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Correspondent Bob 
McNamara begins the "Eye 
on America" feature by 
describing negative ads as 
"the bad breath of American 
politics." Next, MIT political 
scientist Stephen 
Ansolabehere is shown in a 
soundbite, saying "the 
negative advertisements are 
very effective in raising 
doubts." 
 
This is immediately followed 
by a clip from a Bush 
campaign ad (titled 
"Really?") showing Al Gore 
on a small kitchen-counter 
TV (canted to appear much 
like the ad images in ad 
watches), saying "I took the 
initiative in creating the 
internet." The ad clip qua 
news continues with a female 
voice over intoning "yeah, 
and I invented the remote 
control too." 
 
The image of Gore on the 
little TV gives way to noisy 
static (conveying Gore's 
inauthenticity), first full 
screen, then within the 
countertop TV again (right), 
all straight from the Bush ad. 
Then, as correspondent 
McNamara says "as long as 
campaigns have come into 
the kitchen . . . " 
 
The Bush ad continues to 
play full screen, including the 
superimposed URL for the 
Bush web 
site"gorewillsayanything.com
" which appears (barely 
visible as a black line across 
the center of the image, at 
right) adjacent to the small 
TV with Gore on it, now 
shown from a distance, 
clearly revealing its 
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countertop location. 
McNamara pauses slightly, 
and a clip from a 1988 
Dukakis ad now plays. In this 
clip, visibly titled in the ad as 
"the packaging of Dan 
Quayle," actors playing Bush 
campaign consultants are 
seen huddled around a table 
with what appears to be 
computer and video 
equipment. The ad's 
soundtrack fills the void left 
by McNamara's pause: "that 
debate was a disaster," says 
one consultant. "Suddenly 
the words President Quayle 
even make me nervous," 
replies the other. Now 
McNamara's voice returns: 
"there have been negative 
ads." 
 
Next we see the distinguished 
communications scholar 
Lynda Lee Kaid stating "the 
all time high offender of 
negative ads, many people 
don't realize, I think, is Bill 
Clinton." Next, a clip from a 
1992 Clinton ad showing in 
black lettering on a white 
screen the words "he asked 
you to believe him." 
 
The ad's narration repeats the 
phrase, and then the ad's 
audio and video changes to 
Vice President Bush 
delivering perhaps his most 
infamous statement, "read 
my lips." The ad then shows 
the text "now he's asking you 
to believe his attacks against 
Bill Clinton." As the ad goes 
back to the audiovisual of 
Bush saying "read my lips," 
Professor Kaid's voice plays 
over the audio and video of 
the ad, still being shown. She 
says, "in his '92 campaign 
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against George Bush," and 
then as she continues, the 
video returns from the ad to 
her speaking, "about 69 
percent of all of his ads were 
negative." 
The report continues with 
McNamara noting that 
George H. Bush himself had 
benefited from negative 
attacks, along with self-
described images of the 
"greatest hits (and misses)" of 
broadcast politics, including 
the 1988 Bush campaign's 
"Revolving Door" and 1964 
Johnson "Daisy Girl" spots. 
The clip from "Revolving 
Door" includes the point at 
which that ad's narration and 
imagery combine to falsely 
suggest that 268 "first degree 
murderers not eligible for 
parole ... escaped" and went 
on to commit crimes such as 
rape and assault (only one 
such escapee committed such 
crimes, the infamous Mr. 
Horton) (Jamieson 1992). 
 
McNamara then notes (while 
more ads play in the 
background) that "women, 
sometimes the targets of the 
most unscrupulous attack 
ads, have turned the tables." 
Kaid, in voice-over, states, 
"women actually use negative 
ads more than men."  
The segment concludes with 
a clip from an anti-Bush ad 
asking "is he ready to lead 
America?," then McNamara 
noting "going negative . . . " 
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Audiovisuals and the Ad Watch 
In building a better ad watch, perhaps the principal shortcoming is the 
lack of attention to the audiovisual claims made by ads (McKinnon et al 
1996; Richardson 1998). This applies to ad watches and even more so to 
the use of ads in "regular" reporting. Consider the concluding story of the 
CBS Evening News on November 6, 2000. The story focused on 
"negative" ads, though no attempt was made to assess the validity of the 
... as the video switches to 
Gore, in the Bush ad featured 
earlier in the segment, now 
framed by a white 
background with a cut-out in 
the shape of a TV screen, 
saying "there's never been a 
time when I've said 
something untrue," followed 
by the ad's punch line, stated 
by the ad's narrator and 
shown in black text on a 
white full screen: "Really?" 
 
McNamara continues the 
narration as a new image 
from an anti-Bush ad appears 
"has often been the difference 
between winning and losing 
say the ad experts." 
 
The video switches quickly 
from an anti-Bush to an anti-
Gore ad ... 
 
... before turning to an ad 
featuring chimps in shirts 
and ties poring over a budget, 
then doing back flips, as 
McNamara signs off: "and 
history is on their side . . ." 
Anchor Dan Rather chuckles 
and reminds viewers not to 
forget "to vote tomorrow."  
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claims made in the ad clips shown; though we are told such ads work to 
raise doubts, we are not told how. 
 
 
In its last story prior to Election Day 2000, this CBS Evening 
News "Eye on America" feature on negative advertising 
interspersed images from ads running in much of the nation 
at the time with expert commentary, magnifying the Bush 
campaign theme that Al Gore was untrustworthy. The 
segment also embraces the stereotypical disdain for 
"negative" advertising that permeates elite and mass 
discourse, while noting such spots "work." The feature 
illustrates much of what critics say is wrong with how the 
media covers political advertising. It uses unidentified full 
screen clips from campaign ads in news, leading viewers to 
confuse where they learned what, and may magnify the 
power of the ads shown--especially when they are woven 
into the fabric of the dominant narrative frames propagated 
by candidates and filtered by reporters and other observers. 
It focus on campaign strategy, not the veracity of the claims 
made in political ads. 
(See associated File #1 to view) 
 
The CBS feature managed to weave in three separate audiovisual clips 
from the Bush ad "Really?" that was then running heavily in selected 
media markets in the Midwest, East, and Pacific Northwest the night 
before the election. In fact, that ad would appear just 30 seconds after the 
close of the CBS Evening News on KYW channel 3 in Philadelphia, the 
fourth largest media market in the country. A slightly distracted viewer 
might look up at the TV one minute, see the CBS Evening News, see the 
Bush ad on the news and then look up again and see the Bush ad as an ad, 
albeit an ad itself designed to look like news. Moreover, Jamieson (1992) 
has noted how upon repeated viewings, merely showing part of an ad can 
induce recall of the whole of the ad. 
All in all, a curious send off to the electorate the night before the vote 
from a newscast ostensibly serving the public interest. Of course the 
antipathy shown toward politicians in the feature may be more appealing 
to an audience itself already way past cynical. It was, though, a microcosm 
of the campaign coverage up to that point. Gore was a serial exaggerator. 
Yet, even when reporters explicitly don their ad watch cloth, they 
generally fail to address the implicit audiovisual arguments. A Lexis-Nexis 
search of transcripts from the CBS Evening News suggests they never 
specifically discussed the Bush ad "Really?" which began airing in the 
final days of the campaign. Both the Washington Post and New York 
Times did include brief ad watch features on "Really?" 
The ad is based on a story line that began on August 28, 2000, when 
Vice President Gore made a campaign stop at Florida State University in 
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Tallahassee to push his health care agenda. After hearing several retirees 
describing the difficult choices they faced in trying to determine which 
medicines to buy, Gore called on the drug companies to lower prices. He 
offered as an example his mother-in-law, Margaret Ann Atchieson, who 
he said paid $108 a month for the prescription arthritis medication 
Lodine, and his 14-year old labrador retriever Shiloh, whose prescription 
cost $39 a month for the same drug. "It's pretty bad when you have got to 
pretend to be a dog or a cat to get a price break," Gore remarked. (see 
Robinson 2000a, 2000b; Wasson 2000). 
Gore's appearance generated front-page coverage in Florida, but did 
not receive such prominent play nationwide. Then, on September 18, 
Boston Globe reporter Walter Robinson wrote a story arguing that Gore 
had "mangled the facts." Robinson reported Gore's aides could not say 
whether his mother-in-law took brand name Lodine or the generic 
equivalent; that the figures cited by Gore came not from family bills but 
from a House Democratic study; that the price comparisons erroneously 
assumed the same dosage; and that the prices were wholesale, not retail. 
Yet, Robinson noted, "(t)hose facts aside, Gore's overall message was 
accurate - that many brand-name drugs that have both human and 
animal applications are much more expensive for people than for pets." 
Indeed Robinson would note that the cost of prescription (brand name) 
Lodine "typically ranges from $140 to $174 a month . . . according to a 
Globe review of prices offered by walk-in and online pharmacies" and that 
the dog version (Etogesic), "costs at least $70 a month for comparable 
doses" (Robinson 2000a). Indeed, "(a) check by The New York Times of 
several pharmacies and veterinary clinics in Washington found a price 
disparity between Lodine and Etogesic capsules roughly similar to that 
given by Mr. Gore" though the capsules were of different sizes (Seelye 
2000). 
Yet the press would soon be whipped up into a feeding frenzy, rising 
to the bait laid out on the issue by the Bush-Cheney campaign, which 
produced an 11-paragraph statement on the subject (Kelly 2000).  This 
line was reinforced by public statements depicting Gore as someone who 
"makes up" facts to support his case, linked to repeated GOP claims that 
Gore routinely makes things up, like when had said he "invented" the 
internet. Bush Communications Director Karen Hughes claimed "that the 
vice president is willing to say anything to get elected" (Balz 2000). Vice 
presidential nominee Dick Cheney said Gore "simply makes some things 
up out of whole cloth and repeats them over and over and over again until 
he's called on it" (Cooper 2000). Governor Bush told one interviewer that 
Gore had a tendency "to make up facts to make his case," and that the 
episode "confirms what I have said in the past, that he'll say anything to 
be the president" (Seelye 2000). Bush stated in another interview, "a 
leader doesn't try to exaggerate in order to win" and that "America better 
beware of a candidate who is willing to stretch reality in order to win 
points" (Johnson 2000). 
In the media, the Bush-Cheney campaign would find a willing 
accomplice. The bitter antipathy in the press toward Vice President Gore 
was longstanding and well known, dating back at least to Gore's response 
to queries about campaign finance during the 1996 Clinton-Gore 
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reelection effort. Republican operatives seized upon the animosity already 
there and painstakingly fueled the notion of Gore as exaggerator through 
deliberate misrepresentations of Gore's statements (Parry 2000). By the 
fall campaign, the disdain was palpable, and it can be gleaned from USA 
Today columnist Walter Shapiro's take on Gore's prescription drug 
claims. He wrote, "(c)ampaigns do mete out a certain rough justice. If a 
candidate insists on being cloistered from both the press and the public, 
then he runs the risk that a minor snafu like the Shiloh affair may end up 
biting him in the leg" (Shapiro 2000). By the end of the week during 
which the story "broke," editorialists from coast to coast were piling on 
Gore for yet another exaggeration that cast doubt on his fitness to serve. 
Who knows where the story would have gone had reporters been aware 
that in fact Gore's mother-in-law's prescriptions were being filled for free 
by the White House physician (Shrum 2007)! 
So it was that when the Bush-Cheney campaign released the ad 
"Really?," the ground had already been softened for the character assault 
that would follow. 
 
BUSH-CHENEY AD: "REALLY?" 
NARRATOR: Remember when Al Gore said his 
mother-in-law's prescription cost more than his dog's? His 
own aides said the story was made up. Now Al Gore is 
bending the truth again. The press calls Gore's Social 
Security attacks "nonsense." Governor Bush sets aside $ 2.4 
trillion to strengthen Social Security and pay all benefits. 
VICE PRESIDENT GORE: There has never been a 
time when I have said something in this campaign that I 
know to be untrue. There has never been a time when I have 
said something untrue. 
NARRATOR: Really? 
(See Associated File #2 to view) 
In his ad watch, Washington Post media writer Howard Kurtz noted this 
was "perhaps (the) harshest" Bush attack during the campaign, that "Gore 
did not 'make up' the drug story but clearly misstated the facts," that 
"(t)he only 'press' cited as calling Gore's Social Security attacks nonsense 
is the Wall Street Journal's conservative editorial page," that the video of 
Gore was taken from a January debate, and even that "many newspapers 
have echoed Gore's criticism that Bush's Social Security plan threatens 
the budget surplus" (Kurtz 2000). In his single paragraph ad watch, Kurtz 
does an admirable job of identifying crucial flaws in the Bush ad's logic, 
though he notably does not address the interaction of narrative and video, 
failing to mention, for example, that the ad makes it appear that Gore is 
denying ever having said anything untrue during the campaign in "real 
time," i.e., the recent days after the fall presidential debates, and after the 
latest feeding frenzy over his "pattern of embellishment." He does note 
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that the "sarcastic tag line softens the attack," but never explicitly explains 
that the joke itself is based on a fraudulent audiovisual juxtaposition, and 
how much the joke is central to the emotional impact of the ad. While he 
noted that Gore didn't "make up" the dog drug story, he didn't mention 
that those are the very words the Bush-Cheney ticket had been 
relentlessly (and by Kurtz's own analysis, erroneously) tarring Gore with 
since the publication of the Boston Globe piece. 
Peter Marks (2000) ad watch in the New York Times does show 
sensitivity to the ad's emotional core, though it does far less to clarify the 
flaws in the Bush claims while amplifying its effects. He wrote, "(t)he spot 
is funny, devastating" and that "it cleverly changes the subject by 
suggesting that Mr. Gore's attacks are merely further evidence of a 
propensity for stretching the truth." (The ad was a response to Gore ads 
featuring Nobel Prize winning economists claiming Bush's Social Security 
plans would lead to huge budget deficits.) Marks concludes, "(t)he spot's 
payoff is the mocking clip in which Mr. Gore asserts that 'there has never 
been a time' when he uttered an untruth, and the announcer's cynical 
comeback. The commercial deftly shifts the focus from whatever doubts 
voters may have about Mr. Bush's proposal to questions about Mr. Gore's 
character."  Marks seems unaware of the implication of Gore's remark 
being taken chronologically out of context; he adopts the Republican 
frame of Gore as serial exaggerator unquestioningly; fails to challenge the 
Bush language that Gore's misattribution of the source of the drug price 
quotes means he "made up" the story; chooses not to distinguish between 
"the press" and the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal; and 
apparently finds no fault in shifting debate from the trillions of dollars at 
issue in the Bush Social Security plan to the few dollars worth of 
exaggeration in the Gore drug price remarks on the basis of "funny . . . 
clever . . .mocking . . . cynical" advertising that "deftly" weaves distortion 
and falsehood. 
Arguably, "Gore as exaggerator" became a greater exaggeration than 
Gore's original exaggerations. What are we to think, moreover, of a 
campaign operation so ruthlessly and relentlessly dedicated to 
misrepresentation? And of a press so cynical and skeptical as to be readily 
manipulated by campaign operatives? In hindsight, one might claim that 
the nation would have been better served if the press had zeroed in on the 
Bush-Cheney campaign's manipulation of facts and events and what it 
said about how they would govern. Alas, such efforts would no doubt have 
met fierce cries of bias, an institutional conundrum from which no easy 
escape avails itself to reporters. Yet, in focusing instead on the character 
flaws of Gore, the press downplayed the character flaws of Bush, and in 
neither case was the notion of character sufficiently engaged. 
The task facing the prospective ad watcher is daunting. What more 
could be done? Regarding audiovisual distortion, at least one possibility is 
suggested by political scientist Edward Tufte, a renowned expert on visual 
representation of data. He wrote: 
One way to enforce some standard of truth-telling is to insist that 
the innocent, unprocessed natural image be shown along with the 
manipulated image, and, further, that the manipulators and their 
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methods be identified. If images are to be credible, their source 
and history must be documented. And, if an image is to serve as 
serious evidence, a more rigorous accounting should reveal the 
overall pool of images from which the displayed image was 
selected. (1997:25) 
In this case, a variation on this theme might be to reproduce the Bush ad 
so that the audiovisual distortion of the chronology of events is removed. 
That is, one could edit the ad so that Gore's remarks, the Bush ad claims 
and so on, were presented in the order in which they actually occurred, 
rather in the misleading order presented in the ad. Figure shows what 
such a "re-mixed" ad might look like. 
 
"REALLY?" RE-MIX 
This edit of the Bush-Cheney ad "Really?" includes 
every frame from the original ad, but an attempt has been 
made to place all events in proper chronological order. 
This serves to essentially reverse the ad's punch line, 
turning it on Governor Bush's claims to "pay all benefits" 
under his Social Security changes. Such editing could be 
combined with other audiovisual elements of an effective 
ad watch (such as labeling false claims), or one could "edit 
the edit" and just leave what's left of the argumentative 
core of the Bush ad when it has been stripped of its 
distortion and distraction--i.e., just show the part saying 
Bush will pay all benefits, followed by the sneering 
"Really?" punch line. 
(See Associated File #3 to view) 
As much as anything, the "'Really?' Re-mix" demonstrates how hard it is 
to objectively critique the visual claims in campaign advertising without 
reinforcing the very object of critique. The remix also demonstrates, 
however, that if an ad's fundamental persuasive appeal is based on 
misleading visual context, that can be addressed. The re-mix is both less 
coherent and a better representation of the legitimacy of the ad's 
audiovisual "argument." 
Dealing with the audiovisual elements of ads is clearly the biggest 
challenge facing the ad watcher, assuming one can find a way through the 
conflicting claims of partisans who can disagree vehemently over the 
correct time of day. One aspect of that challenge involves determining the 
proper frame of reference from which to assess audiovisual claims. In 
televised political advertising, the key audiovisual referents may well be 
those of popular culture and character (Nelson and Boynton 1997; 
Richardson 1998). This can be illustrated by considering the Bush-Cheney 
advertising in 2004. 
Glenn Richardson  Poroi  15 
The 2004 Bush-Cheney Ad Campaign: The 
Consistency of Character and the Character of 
Consistency 
In their bid to win a second term, at a broad level the Bush-Cheney 
campaign followed two interrelated tracks. The first would seek to 
reinforce the president's definition of himself as a "war president." The 
second was aimed at discrediting opponent John Kerry as the unreliable 
opposite to Bush's steadfast leadership, particularly on the key issue of 
security. To accomplish these objectives, Bush cultivated fear about the 
future and fear about Senator Kerry. The Bush camp ran several ads 
extensively on these issues, including "Peace and Security," "Searching," 
and "Risk." (Other ads also touched on these themes, including "Wolves," 
which echoed the Reagan-Bush ad featuring "a bear in the woods."). 
Taken together, they presented voters a world ripped from the world of 
Jack Bauer, the fictional superhero of the FOX action-thriller "24." 
The ads "Peace and Security" and "Risk" juxtapose scenes of domestic 
tranquility (often personified in the faces of children) with ominous 
warnings about the terrorist threat and accusations that Senator Kerry 
and "liberals in Congress" voted to slash intelligence funds "after the first 
Trade Center attack," and opposed weapons vital to the war on terror. 
"Risk" also claims Kerry opposed "Reagan as he won the Cold War," and 
notes Kerry's opposition to the first Gulf War. "Peace and Security" says 
Kerry "refused to support our troops in combat with the latest weapons 
and body armor." Factcheck.org found the ads' claims false or distorted in 
virtually all of the particulars. They noted that the ads make it sound like 
Kerry voted to "slash" intelligence after the September 11 attack on the 
World Trade Center, when the "first attack on the Trade Center" occurred 
in 1993. Kerry's proposals to cut roughly 1 percent from the intelligence 
budget came five days after the Washington Post had reported that one 
intelligence agency, the super-secret National Reconnaissance Office, had 
quietly hoarded between $1 billion and $1.7 billion in unspent funds 
without informing the Central Intelligence Agency or the Pentagon. The 
CIA was in the midst of an inquiry into the NRO's funding because of 
complaints that the agency had spent $300 million on unspent funds 
from its classified budget to build a new headquarters building in Virginia 
a year earlier. ... Also, the very same day Kerry proposed his $1.5 billion 
cut, the Senate passed by voice vote an amendment proposed by 
Republican Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania to eliminate $1 billion 
in intelligence funds for fiscal year 1996. Specter made clear he was 
attempting to recoup $1 billion in unused intelligence funds from the 
NRO .... (http://www.factcheck.org/article153.html) 
Bush-Cheney charges that Kerry voted against weapons vital to the 
war on terror, Factcheck noted, were equally distorted. Kerry did oppose 
certain strategic weapons (such as the MX missile and B-2 Stealth 
bomber) but both were also abandoned by George H.W. Bush in his 1992 
State of the Union Address in which he also announced plans for a 30 
percent reduction in military spending. The Bush campaign identified the 
AH-64 Apache helicopter as another vital weapon opposed by Kerry even 
while Dick Cheney proposed canceling the same weapon five years after 
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Kerry had. Other weapons "opposed" by Kerry were part of larger 
spending bills; Kerry never voted against the specific weapons he is 
charged with opposing in the Bush ads. Kerry was also correct in claiming 
to have "voted for some of the largest defense and intelligence budgets in 
our history.” In fact, Kerry voted for every regular defense authorization 
bill since 1997, and did so in 16 of the 19 years he had served in the 
Senate. (http://www.factcheck.org/article147.html; 
http://www.factcheck.org/article177.html). 
In some ways, the claim that Kerry opposed body armor for the troops 
is the most vicious of all. Kerry never voted specifically against body 
armor. His vote against the $87 billion supplemental spending bill for 
Iraq that included body armor funds was coupled with his support of a 
bill to provide the same support while paying for it with tax increases on 
the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans. Kerry's legislative positioning 
translated miserably into his "I voted for the $87 billion before I voted 
against it" comment that was immediately and incessantly broadcast in 
Bush-Cheney ads. Lost in the translation was the fact that it was President 
Bush that had sent the troops to Iraq in the first place without providing 
sufficient funds for body armor 
(http://www.factcheck.org/article155.html). 
On the merits, then, the specific claims of the Bush-Cheney campaign 
amount to a pattern of outright falsehoods and grotesque distortions. And 
while the ad cops at Factcheck.org set the facts straight, they rarely 
addressed the audiovisual reinforcements of the ads master narrative. 
Those elements were substantial on their own. 
BUSH-CHENEY AD: "RISK" 
NARRATOR: After September 11th, our world 
changed. Either we fight terrorists abroad or face them 
here. John Kerry and liberals in Congress have a 
different view. They opposed Reagan as he won the 
Cold War. Voted against the first Gulf War. Voted to 
slash intelligence after the first Trade Center attack. 
Repeatedly opposed weapons vital to winning the War 
on Terror. John Kerry and his liberal allies. Are they a 
risk we can afford to take today? 
PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm George W. Bush and I 
approve this message. 
(See Associated File #4 to view) 
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"Risk" begins with an image from Ground Zero after the 
September 11 attack on the World Trade Center with an American 
flag flying in the wind. The image is chopped into various sized 
squares and rectangles, each of which can be replaced by either a 
black box or image. The Ground Zero imagery may prime viewers 
to think of September 11, 2001 when several seconds later they 
hear the narration about Kerry favoring cuts in intelligence "after 
the first Trade Center attack," (emphasis added) which sounds to 
the ear a lot like "after the World Trade Center attack." The 
independent boxes within the video echo the use of simultaneous 





A fade transition joins the Ground Zero image with that of an armed, 
masked terrorist. 




The terrorist image fades into that of the face of a young child. The 
haunting musical score builds in intensity as the camera zooms in 
on the child's eye ... 
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... reaching a climax as the rectangles and boxes disappear, the 
camera zooms in on the eye of the child drawing closer until the 
child's eye begins to reveal an image that appears to be Ronald 
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As the timeline fades out, the child's face fades in, along with the 
text, "John Kerry and His Liberal Allies. Are They a Risk We Can 
Afford to Take Today?" as the soundtrack draws silent, followed by 
President Bush reading the ad's disclaimer. 
 
 
In "Risk," the imagery focuses for the most part on military and 
intelligence actions in the field, bracketed by the image of the child's eye. 
In "Peace and Security," the focus shifts to the home front, with scenes of 
domestic life punctuated by images suggesting the urgency of ticking 
time, the very essence of the underlying plot line in "24." 
 
BUSH-CHENEY AD: "PEACE AND SECURITY " 
NARRATOR: History’s lesson… Strength builds peace… 
Weakness invites those who would do us harm. 
Unfortunately, after the first World Trade Center attack, 
John Kerry and congressional liberals tried to slash six 
billion dollars from intelligence budgets. And tried to cut or 
eliminate over 40 weapons now fighting the War on Terror. 
And refused to support our troops in combat with the latest 
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weapons and body armor. 
PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm George W. Bush and I 
approve this message. 
(See Associated File #5 to view) 
 
 
The ad begins visually and aurally with the hurried ticking of time; 
episodes of "24" also begin by setting the time and returning to it 
at each station break. Here, the ever present clock fades in and 
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... into a whooping ceiling fan. As the hurried businessman hails a 
cab before checking his watch, the narrator says Kerry voted to 
slash intel funds, exaggerating his position and inviting the false 
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The graphic linkages draw the connection between "Kerry & 
Congressional Liberals" providing visually compelling"support" 
for the claims; the clock ticks throughout, the threat lurking like 
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Audio special effects punctuate each charge with short, forceful 
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... as a backpack-wearing young girl climbs into the family 
minivan, the narrator says Kerry "refused to support our troops in 
combat" and repeats the scurrilous body armor attack. The hands 
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The narrative and imagery are only loosely conjoined logically; but as an 
audiovisual package, they become one in the minds’ of viewers, who fill in 
the spaces of the gestalt. The alleged sins of Kerry's voting record extend 
risk from the soldiers in the battlefield to the suburban warriors on the 
home front. In contrast to "Risk," the aural punctuation of "Peace and 
Security" has a more domestic ring to it. Crashing cymbals and special 
effects accompany images of ceiling fans and window blinds rather than 
attack helicopters and the computers at the counter terrorism center. But 
the core emotion is the same: an ever-present tense fear.  In the 2002 film 
The Sum of All Fears, the moment when Director of Central Intelligence 
William Cabot learns that a loose nuke has been delivered to Baltimore, 
(while he and the president are watching a football game at a stadium in 
that very city) is dramatized by the camera slowly panning the crowd.  
The effect is to highlight the ordinariness of the oblivious fans, soon to be 
visited by the most ominous of horrors.  A similar audiovisual dynamic 
plays out in “Peace and Security.” 
The Bush ad "Weapons" presented the charge that Kerry opposed 
various weapons and body armor for the troops in Iraq through images of 
soldiers in the desert and fighter jets vanishing. 
 
 
BUSH AD "WEAPONS" 
GEORGE W. BUSH: I'm George W. Bush, and I 
approve this message. 
NARRATOR: As our troops defend America in the 
War on Terror, they must have what it takes to win. Yet 
John Kerry has repeatedly opposed weapons vital to 
winning the War on Terror: Apache helicopters, C-130 
Hercules, and F-16 fighter jets, components of which are 
all built here in Florida. Kerry even voted against body 
armor for our troops on the front line of the War on 
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The ad begins by visually opposing our troops defending America 
and Kerry's opposition to Weapons. Military style drumbeats are 
heard at the beginning. As the voice over and text on the screen 
turn to Kerry, a bell chime sounds, and the troops begin to move 
in slow motion as the soundtrack turns more ominous. 
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As the ad charges Kerry with opposition to specific weapons, a jet 
swoops in (left) only to be engulfed in the dark clouds symbolizing 
the threat posed by Kerry. Frightening sound effects mark each 
charge against Kerry. 
 
The plane continues to fade out as two others appear on the left of 
the screen. As "built in Florida" is highlighted, soon all the planes 
have disappeared, leaving the troops without the weapons 
(presumably the ones Kerry opposed). 
 
 




Stripped of fighter jets, helicopters, and troop transport planes, 
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the desert encampment stands alone as the superimposed text and 
narration level the vicious attack that Kerry opposed body armor, 
followed by a second bell chime. The sound effects suggest a 
windstorm or even tornado as the ominous clouds continue to roll 
across the landscape. A lone soldier looks in the direction of the 
others off in the distance as the dark cloud threatens them. Then 
he looks toward the screen as if to appeal to the viewer to support 
the troops by opposing Kerry. 
"Weapons" began airing early in the campaign. In the final days of the 
campaign, the ad "Whatever It Takes" began to air. It is a stirring 
response to the most searing indictment of Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 
9/11, the suggestion that Bush was oblivious or uncaring about the human 
costs of the Iraq War. The ad is based on a section of Bush's acceptance 
speech at the Republican Convention in New York. His words are solemn 
and inspirational. The ad interposed imagery of audiences of soldiers and 
veterans, including an image of a particular soldier that had been edited 
into the same crowd scene more than once, providing minor 
embarrassment for the campaign after it was initially exposed by a 
posting on the liberal weblog DailyKos (Rutenberg 2004). The ad ends 
in with an emotional crescendo and a frenzy of flag waving enthusiasm. 
 
 
BUSH AD "WHATEVER IT TAKES" 
PRESIDENT BUSH: These four years have 
brought moments I could not foresee and will not 
forget. I’ve learned first hand that ordering 
Americans into battle is the hardest decision, even 
when it is right. I have returned the salute of 
wounded soldiers who say they were just doing their 
job. I've held the children of the fallen who are told 
their dad or mom is a hero but would rather just 
have their mom or dad. I’ve met with the parents and 
wives and husbands who have received a folded flag. 
And in those military families, I have seen the 
character of a great nation. Because of your service 
and sacrifice, we are defeating the terrorists where 
they live and plan and you’re making America safer. I 
will never relent in defending America, whatever it 
takes. (voiceover): I’m George W. Bush and I 
approved this message. 
Bush is doing that which only the president can. The "set" at the 
convention featured a gigantic presidential seal, and "Whatever It Takes" 
invokes the full range of the office, both as commander-in-chief and Chief 
of State, while deploying a full palette of audiovisual evocations of 
leadership. Bush not only orders troops into battle, he returns the salutes 
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of wounded soldiers and he's there when the aggrieved receive the "folded 
flag." The ad's uplifting musical score emphasizes what, in Bush's 
convention speech, was already an emotionally moving moment. Visuals 
show rapt interest in viewers looking "up" at the president. It was the high 
point of the speech, and serves as an emotional high note for the 
campaign. The ad concludes with the tag line, "whatever it takes." The 
very essence of the Bush campaign was devoted to the notion that this is 
literally the case, and that, implicitly, John Kerry will not do "whatever it 
takes" to defend America. While Kerry's character is portrayed as 
questionable unto despicable, Bush's character becomes one with the 
character of the military families, "the character of a great nation." 
The twin Bush messages that John Kerry is an unreliable foe to terror 
and that the terror threat is frightening are manifest in the ad 
"Searching," and especially in its use of visual transitions to punctuate 
each clip in the ad. According to Factcheck.org, "(t)his ad is the most 
egregious example so far in the 2004 campaign of using edited quotes in a 
way that changes their meaning and misleads voters" 
(http://www.factcheck.org/article269.html). If "Whatever It Takes" is 
designed to define Bush's character, "Searching" is the Bush's campaign's 
attempt to define John Kerry's character, narratively and audiovisually. 
The ad begins with a disclaimer featuring colorful images of the 
president and his wife, then turns dark. Better the ad's sponsor be 
seen smiling before the horror show than after. 
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PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm George W. Bush and I approve this 
message. 
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SENATOR KERRY: It was the right decision to disarm Saddam 
Hussein, and when the President made the decision I supported him. 
The ad uses attenuated visual punctuation, superimposing vertical bars 
across the image fading in of Kerry on a TV. The bars are like those in the 
Bush-Cheney 2000 ad "Really?" but appear harsher and more foreboding. 
The depiction of Kerry on TV follows the pattern established by Bush 
advertising in 2000 which invariably portrayed Vice President Al Gore 
"on TV", usually canted, just as in the ad watch format developed by 
Jamieson to highlight the questionable claims in ads without allowing the 
ad to appear "as news" (Richardson 2002). 
In this ad, a tense, ominous piano theme develops, joined by an eerie, 
solemn counterpoint melody evoking horror and threat. They reach a 
crescendo at the end of the ad, accompanied by the electronic slashing of 
the guillotine sound effect (oft heard in political advertising) following 
Kerry being shown saying "I actually did vote for the $87 billion dollars 
before I voted against it." 
 
 





Subsequent visual punctuation turns downright radioactive, with Kerry's 
TV image glowing brightly, then becoming clearer, though not clear. 
 
SENATOR KERRY: The winning of the war was brilliant. 
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SENATOR KERRY: I don't believe the President took us to war 
as he should have. 
Additional violent transitions mark the separation of different 
clips from the Massachusetts Senator. 
SENATOR KERRY: It's the wrong war, in the wrong place, at 
the wrong time. 
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SENATOR KERRY: I have always said we may yet even find weapons of 
mass destruction. 
The ad images take the use of unflattering images of the opponent to new 
heights, combining vertical bars and the sudden dramatic shift in lighting 








The Kerry statements quoted by Bush in fact are perfectly consistent, 
especially when taken in context. Kerry voted to authorize force against 
Iraq (while hoping Bush would use the vote as a bargaining chip rather 
than green light); he praised the way the military conducted the first 
phase of the war and consistently argued that Bush went about the war 
the wrong way by not allowing more time for diplomacy and by failing to 
secure a broad coalition of allied support. The subtlety of Kerry's 
positioning is ransacked first by the narrative distortions of the ad, and 
then more forcefully by the searing video attack. The video portrays Kerry 
in a monstrous light that would be implausible even in a Bush-Cheney ad 
if attempted with word alone. The evocative imagery relies on viewers to 
fill in the horrifying details on their own; the ad provides the match to the 
preexisting kindling of audiovisual associations in viewers. Through the 
Bush ads, the question ceases to be the consistency of Kerry's character, 
instead becoming the characterization of Kerry's consistency. 
Recognizing that campaign ads draw upon popular culture to convey 
the emotional substance of their persuasive appeal is one thing; 
effectively countering such evocation is quite another. One could argue 
that if the appeal or characterization itself is grounded in the 
unarticulated premises drawn from the audiovisual and narrative 
conventions of popular entertainment, so too must be the counter appeal 
or counter-characterization. The first step would be to recognize the 
cultural referents, then name them. Once identified, counter 
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characterizations can be offered in context. Here, for example, if George 
Bush is suggesting to viewers that he is the Jack Bauer of the real "war on 
terror," then perhaps the most effective counter characterizations that 
have to be made are those pointing to the flaws in the Bauer approach. 
Rather than attempting to argue the specific merits of this or that 
surveillance or interrogation technique of the Bush administration, which 
may fail to sustain the attention of many voters, the more fundamental 
task may be to document why Jack Bauer's approach to fighting terror is 
ultimately flawed. 
The parallel between Bauer and Republicans and the Bush 
administration has not gone unnoticed. New York Times editorialist 
Maureen Dowd wrote that "(i)f the Democrats are like the dithering 
'Desperate Housewives,' the Republicans have come across like the 
counter terrorism agent Jack Bauer on '24': fast with a gun, loose with the 
law, willing to torture in the name of protecting the nation. Except Jack 
Bauer is competent" (Dowd 2006). From the right, Patrick Buchanan has 
referred to Bush as our "Jack Bauer in the war on terror," and writers for 
the conservative American Spectator and Washington Times have made 
the linkage as well (Orr 2006). In a piece on the politics of "24" in The 
New Republic, Christopher Orr describes the series (which he sees the 
defining TV show of the era) in a way that echoes the fabric of the Bush 
ads described above: 
Now wrapping up its fifth season, the show plays like a breakneck 
rundown of Richard Clarke's apocalyptic nightmares: loose nukes, 
weaponized viruses, nerve gas attacks, assassination attempts, 
government conspiracies, terrorist cells and subcells. For those not yet on 
the edge of their seats, the urgency of these threats is further upped by 
"24"'s signature gimmick: The show takes place in "real time," with each 
episode constituting one hour--complete with ticking clock bracketing 
commercial breaks--and each season adding up to a single, frenzied, 24-
hour day (Orr 2006). 
It is possible, then, that one might be more effective in engaging the 
central issues in confronting terrorism by confronting Jack Bauer than by 
confronting George Bush. Orr, for example, notes that, "the contours of 
Bauer's character have far less to do with the demands of geopolitics than 
with the demands of genre.  Bauer is not a hero because he does whatever 
is necessary; whatever he does is necessary because he is the hero" (Orr 
2006). Bauer is right when he uses any means necessary; so too is he right 
when he chooses a more humane approach. Orr also points to the 
simultaneously maddening and endearing tendency of Agent Bauer to put 
the nation at risk, jeopardizing national security as he applies his 
whatever it takes mentality to protecting his family. George Lakoff has 
argued that the fundamental difference between liberals and 
conservatives is that, while both use the metaphor of the nation as a 
family (with political leaders as the parents and citizens as the children) 
to reason through the otherwise daunting complexities of politics, 
conservatives embrace a strict-father morality while liberals value a more 
nurturant-parent morality (Lakoff 1996). Lakoff's work pre-dates the 
September 11 attacks, and the implications of his approach for such issues 
are not completely obvious. Yet, if in fact he is right about the differences 
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between liberals and conservatives, the Bauer case offers a potentially 
clarifying template. In Bauer's private-before-public morality, the issue 
becomes joined in a vivid, accessible way. The very characteristics that 
initially appear strong may in fact be weak; the issue of whether there is a 
larger "we," beyond the family or tribe, to which Americans owe 
allegiance can be brought to the fore. It can be done, moreover, in a way 
that engages ordinary Americans without becoming bogged down in 
wonkspeak. 
Orr concludes his analysis by suggesting that the politics of "24" are 
far more ambiguous than conservatives fathom, and not entirely 
inspiring: 
"24" is, in some ways, the perfect cultural artifact for this post-
September 11 moment. It extols patriotism but doesn't quite 
believe in it, preaches a self-sacrifice it practices only 
intermittently, and offers up a world in which the choices are 
always impossible but the answers are always right. On the 
surface, it flatters our belief that we're better now, more stoic and 
unselfish, committed to ideals larger than our individual wants 
and needs. But, below, it reassures us that it's OK to place our 
own households first, that politics is empty if not actively corrupt, 
and that belief in a cause will only lead to disillusion or betrayal 
(Orr 2006). 
The move to engage fact through fiction is not as far-fetched as it 
sounds. Former counter terrorism chief Richard Clarke explained why he 
turned to fiction writing to convey his fact-based concerns about future 
terrorist threats in an article written for the Atlantic Monthly (Clarke 
2005): "(i)n both the Clinton and Bush administrations, the only time I 
was really effective in getting senior officers to pay attention was when I 
had tabletop war games ... (t)hat did more than any briefing paper I might 
write'' (Rich 2005). Clark told interviewer Frank Rich of the New York 
Times that ''(p)op culture is frequently ahead of where the news media are 
on these things." Clarke noted that while in 2002, then national security 
advisor to President Bush Condoleeza Rice said "I don't think anybody 
could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it 
into the World Trade Center,'' in 1994 Tom Clancy's novel Debt of Honor 
involved a 747 crashing into the Capitol during a Joint Session of 
Congress at the hand of a Japanese pilot, and the 1996 movie "Executive 
Decision" featured Islamic terrorists who had seized control of another 
747 so they could detonate a biological weapon in the nation's capital. 
(Investigations have shown that actual threat reports within the U.S. 
government did predict the airplanes as missiles scenario repeatedly 
before September 11, including one threat specifically targeted the World 
Trade Center in 1998) (Rich 2005). 
In essence, then, the question raised by the Bush-Bauer link may be 
whether America really needs a president modeled after a "super patriot 
with ADD" (Sternbergh 2006). 
Engaging the politics of "24" also invites analysts to reverse the flow of 
inference. If "24" helps explain how Bush-Cheney campaign ads work, 
does it also tell us something about the Americans who make up the 
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audience for those ads? The award-winning British journalist Johann 
Hari describes Bauer as a "torturing hero," and laments the "lurch in 
post-9/11 American culture towards the sympathetic, no, glorified, 
depiction of torture" (Hari 2006). In a review of two books on U.S. torture 
in Afghanistan and Iraq appearing in the New Statesman, Ziauddin 
Sardar writes that 
The truth about the torture of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq is 
simple. The Bush administration sanctioned it, the military deployed it, 
and the American public gave it a tacit nod of approval. Most of the 
people who were and are being tortured are innocent. And they are all 
Muslims ... There is a seamless connection between what happens in 
American society, the way society is represented by Hollywood, and the 
torture meted out by US soldiers abroad. In movies, torture is an everyday 
activity. ... Jack Bauer, the counter-terrorist agent in the TV series 24, 
tortures indiscriminately, not caring whether his victims are suspected 
terrorists, colleagues or teenaged girls. The relationship between 
American society and Hollywood is like a feedback loop. The extremity of 
one reinforces the other. ... This is why the soldiers at Abu Ghraib were 
not content simply to take photographs to send to the folks back home, 
but found it necessary to stage their atrocities as special events for the 
camera (Sardar 2005). 
Communications scholar Roger Stahl argues that the nexus between 
Pentagon public relations and popular culture reflects a new turn in civil-
military relations whereby citizens are enabled to “play soldier at a safe 
distance,” through interactive means ranging from films to video games, 
toys, and even theme parks (Stahl 2010).  This reprogramming of citizens 
as an extension of battlefield operations not only dovetails with the Bush-
Cheney campaign’s core message, but it carries profound implications for 
American politics and even the nation’s very identity. 
Ad Watch 3.0 
Glenn Leshner (2001) suggests that while much of the focus of ad watch 
journalism has been on "issues," candidate images are also critical to their 
electoral appeals, and scrutiny to such imagery may provide for a more 
engaging ad watch. Setting aside the limitations of the issue/image 
demarcation, Leshner is surely right in suggesting a broadening of the 
gaze of the ad watch. At the very least, the recognition that candidates are 
propagating claims about their character might prompt a more thoughtful 
discussion the strengths and weaknesses of both the candidates and the 
various archetypical character types. Perhaps more pointedly, observers 
may seek to probe more deeply into the fundamental underpinnings of 
candidates' personalities and psychological make-ups. Not that 
journalists haven't tried to do this at least since James David Barber's 
Presidential Character argued that personality shapes presidents, and 
that journalists ought do more to help voters understand potential 
presidents' personalities. Typically, at some point in the campaign, an 
analyst will produce a thoughtful, detailed assessment of one or more 
candidate's character. In the main in, however, it was very difficult for 
journalists to get much beyond the somewhat misleading brain tattoos 
they had regarding Gore (exaggerator), Kerry (flip-flopper), Bush 
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(unflinching if not so smart), McCain (maverick hero) and Obama 
(rhetorically gifted and inspirational). 
Yet, while the Bush campaign was incessant in picturing Bush as a 
steadfast leader in a time of terror, there were alternate readings of the 
same character traits. Perhaps most notably, (though little discussed in 
the media or elsewhere), Bush's steadfast stubbornness (and what some 
would see as wishful thinking) have all the earmarks of the "dry drunk," 
or individual who has substituted one obsession (in Bush's case, the war 
on terrorism) for another (the bottle) without going through a full 
therapeutic rehabilitation (see for example Schweizer and Schweizer 
2004 on Bush's addictive personality). Whether or not this is actually the 
case with Bush is not the point so much as that such discussions need to 
become part of the palette from which candidate evaluations (and ad 
watches) are drawn. 
So, too, with Senator McCain. If the conventional wisdom was that in 
2000 reporters gave Vice president Gore no quarter, the same press corps 
swooned over the straight-talking maverick from Arizona, whose 
accessibility to the media and willingness to challenge GOP orthodoxy hit 
the proverbial "sweet spot" among many in the fourth estate. Despite 
McCain's steady tilt toward the GOP base from 2002 forward, McCain 
continued to enjoy the favorable if outdated adulation of reporters and 
the punditry throughout much of the 2008 campaign. Left largely untold 
was the story of McCain's dark side: temper tantrums, stubbornness, even 
a self-confessed immaturity. In a sense, the real McCain, rather than 
being an "anti-Bush" figure, was more Bush than Bush. A truth-
challenged third generation child of privilege (John Sydney McCain III) 
whose family name saved him from various and sundry indiscretions, 
sober and not so much, that would have felled less privileged miscreants 
(Dickinson 2008). 
Nor did the mainstream media engage Barack Obama's character in 
great detail. Perhaps misdirected by the candidate's early opposition to 
the war in Iraq and his background as a community organizer on the 
South Side of Chicago, the Illinois senator's centrist penchant for 
compromise and deal-making (so-called "Chicago-style" politics) was less 
noted. Such traits would come to the fore as soon as the transition period 
in late 2008, and seemed to define the president by the time of the debt 
ceiling debacle in the summer of 2011. It is likely that some of the 
reticence to engage Obama on character owed not just to the press but to 
his opponent. McCain, aides would say, had been on the receiving end of 
racially tinged Rovian attack politics (notably in the 2000 South Carolina 
primary) and would not be guilty of the same, at least as far as ads 
attacking the statements of Reverend Jeremiah Wright, Obama's former 
pastor, were concerned (Grann 2008). In fact, ABC News reported after 
the election that the McCain campaign did produce (but did not air) a 
campaign ad offering direct character comparison between POW 
McCain's steadfastness under enemy imprisonment and Obama's 
indifference to Wright's controversial sermons. It is possible had the ad 
been aired, it might have spurred a deeper inspection of the character 
question. 
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On the other hand, the media's response to the McCain-Palin 
campaign's allegation that Obama had been "palling around with 
terrorists" offers little support for the notion that character assaults 
generate rigorous analysis of the character of the candidates. In fact, just 
as reporters willfully adopted the Bush-Quayle characterizations of 
"Willie" Horton in 1988, so too, was the McCain-Palin language adopted 
without resistance. Typical are the first two paragraphs from an October 5 
report in the Los Angeles Times: 
Englewood, Colo. – Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah 
Palin today accused Democrat Barack Obama of “palling around 
with terrorists” because of his association with a former 1960s 
radical, stepping up the campaign’s effort to portray Obama as 
unacceptable to American voters. 
 
Palin’s reference was to Bill Ayers, one of the founders of the 
group the Weather Underground. Its members took credit for 
bombings, including nonfatal explosions at the Pentagon and U.S. 
Capitol, during the tumultuous Vietnam War era four decades 
ago. Obama, who was a child when the group was active, served 
on a charity board with Ayers several years ago and has 
denounced his radical views and activities. 
The reporter's language is clinical to the point of missing what was really 
going on. The story quotes Palin's incendiary assault, but fails to directly 
challenge its explosive core: that Ayers was a "terrorist." As FactCheck.org 
noted on October 10 regarding similar comments made by Senator 
McCain,"if McCain means the word 'terrorist' to invoke images of 9/11, 
he's being misleading; Ayers is no Osama bin Laden now, and never was." 
The Weather Underground did plant bombs in the 1960s. They targeted 
buildings, not people, sent warning in advance, and were designed to 
cause only property damage, not death. No doubt the Obama campaign 
was wise not to engage a debate on the tactics of a fringe group forty years 
prior, but if left the airwaves despoiled with McCain-Palin's arsonry. 
What's the difference between what the Weather Underground did and 
terrorism as practiced by bin Laden, et al? Life and death. 
It is not that the media is unaware of the role of character assessment 
in the campaign. Indeed the phrase "master narrative" became a part of 
insider-speak, and journalistic watchdogs like the Pew Research Center's 
Project for Excellence in Journalism produced detailed studies of 
character in the campaign discourse (see Pew Research Center 2008a). 
Still, the Pew research indicates that of all campaign stories between 
January 1 and May 4, fully 78 percent focused on political concerns such 
as tactics, strategy and the horse race, while only 7 percent addressed 
personal issues. Moreover, much of the media's coverage of character 
telegraphed the messages of the competing campaigns. New York Senator 
Hillary Clinton was portrayed as experienced but also as representative of 
the politics of the past; Barack Obama as an agent of change but lacking 
in experience (Pew Research Center 2008b). 
Yet such distinctions obscure a particular weakness in how the media 
covers campaigns. Charges that a candidate opposed body armor for the 
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troops, for example, are likely to be viewed by the press through a policy 
frame rather than a character frame--despite the powerful resonance with 
character that is more likely to reflect how voters react to such charges. As 
policy, such issues typically carry greater ambiguity than they do as 
reflections of character. Consider how FactCheck.org addressed an 
exchange during the vice presidential debate over Sarah Palin's claim that 
Senator Obama "opposed funding for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan 
... after promising that he would not do so." Democratic vice-presidential 
nominee Joe Biden responded that "John McCain voted the exact same 
way. John McCain voted against funding the troops because of an 
amendment he voted against had a timeline in it to draw down American 
troops" (Commission on Presidential Debates 2008). FactCheck initially 
faulted Biden, but then issued the following correction: 
Correction Oct 3: This article originally faulted Biden for saying 
that McCain had voted "the exact same way” as Obama on a 
controversial troop funding bill. We said that McCain was absent 
for the vote and so didn't vote at all. Biden was, however, correct. 
 
McCain did vote against the troop-funding bill in question, H.R. 
1591, on March 29, 2007, when it originally cleared the Senate. 
The vote to which we referred, and which McCain missed, was a 
later vote on the House-Senate compromise version of the same 
bill, on April 26, 2007. McCain opposed the bill, which Obama 
supported, because it contained language calling for withdrawal 
of troops from Iraq. Biden was responding to Palin's accusation 
that "Obama voted against funding troops." Obama voted for the 
bill March 29 and April 26, and then on May 24, 2007, following 
a veto by President Bush, Obama voted against a similar troop-
funding bill, H.R. 2206, that lacked any withdrawal language. 
(FactCheck.org 2008b) 
Lost in the byzantine legislative history is what Palin's charge suggests 
about Obama's character, and indeed, what making such a questionable 
incendiary remark says about her own character. 
The quest for a more informed analysis of character is not without its 
own troubling conundrums. There is no agreement on which character 
type or personality traits are desirable. Traits desirable in one situation 
may not be so in another. Nor is character a dispositive indicator of 
behavior. Yet, like it or not, character and personal traits will no doubt 
continue to be a vital part of campaign discourse. 
In the future, such personal analysis may increasingly turn on 
biological considerations, even while they, too, are variable indicators of 
potential and probability rather than determinative predictors. In an 
interview on "Bill Moyers Journal on PBS," Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 
perhaps the single most significant academic figure in the ad watch 
movement, argued for taking candidate's health issues seriously. 
Jamieson rejected simple concerns with John McCain's age, noting that 
"parental longevity has a small predictive effect" on longevity and that 
McCain's 95 year-old mother is "is mentally competent" and "articulate." 
By contrast, she noted, "we know that people who've smoked for a long 
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time are more likely to die of a smoking related illness. They're more 
likely to have heart problems. They're more likely to die of lung cancer. 
Well, Barack Obama smoked until very recently" (Moyers 2008). The 
interview continued: 
BILL MOYERS: Do we have a right to expect all the candidates to 
release their medical records, and their family histories? 
 
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON: I believe we do. And I think it 
should be as central a question as our questions about their 
experience in office and their voting records. Some illnesses may 
carry genetic implications. Alzheimer's disease is one of them. 
President Reagan's mother had Alzheimer's disease. It's possible 
that in his second term, he was beginning to suffer some of those 
symptoms. It's possible that the assassination attempt may have 
made some of that worse. So there's some things that we want to 
ask about, not necessarily to disqualify a candidate, but because 
we want to understand the full implications of the health records 
that is available, and the implications, if any, for governance. 
 
The trauma to this country if a president were to die in office is 
such that we have a right to know. And also, importantly, there 
have been major cover-ups in the past. The Kennedy campaign in 
1960 effectively covered up Addison's disease. The Tsongas 
campaign effectively covered up the recurrence of cancer, and had 
Paul Tsongas, Senator Tsongas been elected president, he would 
have died in office. So we ought to, I think ask, what do we want 
to know when the age issue is raised? I think we want to know 
about health (Moyers 2008). 
At one level, the implications of Jamieson's position are chilling. It seems 
she is optimistic in seeking admission of information about genetic make-
up, "not necessarily to disqualify a candidate" when in fact that would 
seem to be a possibility if not the probable outcome of such disclosure. 
Society has yet to resolve such tensions, which have begun to crop up with 
greater frequency in employment and insurance settings. While medical 
research may be able to show patterns, linkages, and probabilities, they 
are far less than certainties. What of the cases of Reagan and Kennedy? 
Had either been disqualified on health grounds, would it have necessarily 
served the public interest? Could it be that no sooner had America finally 
abandoned the "whites only" White House then a whole new pattern of 
discrimination would take hold, one based even more precisely on 
genetics? 
Realistically, it is unlikely that such a moment can be avoided. In a 
sense, however, the flaw in human intellect that causes vivid examples to 
override systematic evidence to the contrary may be the last refuge of 
human potential. Medical and genetic information may be uncontainable. 
While it is possible such knowledge may lead to costly prejudice, perhaps 
it will, instead, spawn an even greater appreciation for the human 
capacity to transcend one's "destiny," genetic or otherwise. 
Truth and Consequence 
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One of the great challenges in policing campaign discourse is discerning 
and communicating what is truly significant and consequential. Scholars 
have noted that the steady drip of ad watchers and fact checkers may 
leave voters with the misleading impression that candidates for office are 
inveterate dissemblers of falsehood and mistruth, while simultaneously 
allowing true whoppers to pass by virtually undistinguished from their 
garden-seed variety peers (Richardson 1998). By 2008, some ad cops had 
begun to tentatively address this challenge. Politifact.com's "truth-o-
meter" scored candidate claims into one of six categories as "true," 
"mostly true," "half true," "barely true," "false," and "pants on fire" (when 
"the statement is not accurate and makes a ridiculous claim"). The 
Washington Post's The Fact Checker used a "Pinocchio Test," with 
candidates' claims earning up to four "pinocchios" (for "whoppers") or the 
"prized Gepetto checkmark" for statements containing "the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth." 
Such efforts are potentially noteworthy improvements over earlier ad 
watch practice which, rather than putting the pieces of the puzzle 
together, served more to cut them up further still. Yet, there is room for 
additional refinement, for example, a running tally of each candidate's 
transgressions to date. Neither The Fact Checker nor Politifact's "truth-o-
meter" explictly tallied candidates cumulative scores in 2008. Such a 
scoreboard might discourage recidivist dissemblers by presenting a single 
metric reflecting upon their truthfulness. It would also allow a ready 
comparison across ad watchers, illuminating patterns of analysis and 
evaluation. Both The Fact Checker and Politifact's "truth-o-meter," 
presented ad watch evaluations which can easily be expressed in 
cumulative terms in 2008. (FactCheck did not produce numerical scoring 
of candidate claims in 2008). 
Table I summarizes the "scoring" of candidate claims by The Fact 
Checker and Politifact's "truth-o-meter" that appeared between 
September 1 and Election Day. Higher scores represent greater deception 
or distortion. Stories addressed both claims made in ads and statements 
made by candidates. 
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TABLE I. 
AD WATCH AND STATEMENT SCORING  
2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
 
   The Fact Checker   “Truth-o-meter” 
   (Washington Post)   (Politifact.com) 
   (4-Point Scale)   (5-Point Scale) 
Candidate  Obama McCain  Obama McCain 
Number of Entries 10  12   21  20 
Total Points  22  26   34  31 
Average Score  2.2  2.2   1.6  1.6 
 
Remarkably, both operations scored both candidates fidelity to the truth 
exactly evenly! Perhaps this is not so amazing given the intense scrutiny 
to press bias during political campaigns. Nonetheless, it is hard to 
imagine that during the course of a campaign in which the two candidates 
faced different strategic challenges and were attempting to mobilize 
different bases of support with vastly different perspectives on politics 
and the truth that this would be the case. Politifact's "truth-o-meter" did 
find a notable disparity in its "pants-on-fire" category for the most 
egregious distortions, issuing seven such ratings for McCain over the 
course of the entire campaign, but just two for Obama (Politifact 
2008a). 
Comparison of the content of the different ad watchers is complicated 
by the fact that it was actually relatively rare for both sites to adjudicate 
the same claims. Sometimes this was a matter of how a claim being 
scrutinized was framed. For example, consider the question of small 
business tax rates and Senator McCain's use of "Joe the Plumber," one 
Samuel Wurzelbacher who turned out to be neither a plumber nor named 
Joe. McCain's claim that Mr. Wurzelbacher's taxes would increase under 
Obama's plan was given three "pinocchios" by The Fact Checker, whereas 
Politifact's "truth-o-meter" scored instead Obama's claim that 98 percent 
of small business owners would see no tax hike as "true." 
Perhaps more significantly, one can question how particular claims 
were scored. John McCain's claim that the federal government had spent 
$3.1 million to "study the DNA of bears in Montana" (an example of the 
kind of earmark pork he denounced) was scored as "mostly true" by 
Politifact's analysis even though in fact McCain actually voted for the bill 
that included the earmark, after having introduced several amendments, 
including three targeting "pork," but none opposing the bear study 
(FactCheck.org 2007). At the same time, Politifact's basis for not crediting 
McCain with a fully true statement was that federal spending on the bear 
study had actually increased by $1.7 million in the years since the bill 
originally passed than McCain said. One could say that in fact McCain's 
statement was more true than he claimed, if the point was that federal 
spending on sketchy appropriations was a significant budgetary problem! 
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In short, in order for a running tally to be more meaningful, there 
would have to be some distinction between the candidates. That might 
very result from more rigorous attention to the degree of misstatement 
involved. In developing frameworks like the "pinocchio test" ad watchers 
have explicitly recognized that not all misstatements are created equal. 
Sometimes this can be readily quantified. Consider Obama's claim that 95 
percent of the American people would get a tax cut under his proposals. 
Politifact's "truth-o-meter" rated the statement as "half-true," citing a 
nonpartisan study by the Tax Policy Center finding that 81 percent of tax 
filers would see tax reductions. Their conclusion: "[t]he difference 
between 81 percent and 95 percent is not insignificant. We rule his debate 
statement Half True" (Politifact 2008b). Mathematically, Obama's 
statement is actually 85 percent true, as it were, and not half (50 
percent)-true. In its analysis of the first presidential debate, 
FackCheck.org noted misstatements by both candidates. Obama's, as in 
the above example, were off by perhaps, on average, 25 percent. McCain 
misstatements called out by FactCheck outnumbered Obama 
misstatements by at least 2-to-1. And their magnitude was often much 
greater, as in McCain's claim that earmarks had more than tripled, when 
FactCheck cited a study by the group Citizens Against Government Waste 
found a decrease in earmarks between 2003 and 2008 of 24 percent, 
amounting to an error of some 324 percent (FactCheck.org 2008c). 
It is not just the degree of misstatement that is of concern, however, 
but also the consequences of that statement. One rough indicator of 
consequence is how many people are likely to be affected. The power of 
terrorism is that the pool of those affected is all inclusive. It could happen 
to anyone, giving it particular force. While debates over prescription drug 
costs for seniors can be seen passionately as life or death issues, and even 
given that we all hope to someday be old, the urgent consequence would 
seem lower than distortions about terror or the war on terror (or terror 
war). One potential formulation for a more precise measurement of 
misstatement would be: 
Degree of distortion x significance/consequence of distortion x 
volume of repetition = severity of infraction 
It may be that rather than an interval level equation (a 100-point scale, 
for example), a categorical approach (high, medium, low, for example) 
would be more appropriate. Either way, some explicit consideration of 
each of the three factors would seem to be warranted. 
Merging truth, character and consequence: 
multimodal ad watching 
By the spring of 2012, the pillars of ad watch journalism have become well 
established.  Politifact was awarded a Pulitizer Prize for National 
Reporting for its coverage of the 2008 campaign.  Its franchise extended 
from its Truth-o-Meter (with its “pants on fire” appellation for the claims 
it finds most egregious) to its “Obameter,” “Flip-O-Meter,” and GOP-
Pledge-O-Meter), and in February 2012 it reported it had completed its 
5,000th Truth-o-Meter fact-check.  Kindred spirits “The Fact Checker” 
(from the Washington Post) and FactCheck.org are now veterans of 
Glenn Richardson  Poroi  51 
several national election cycles as well. As of the 2012 campaign, the 
Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania 
(sponsor of FactCheck.org) has created FlackCheck.org, a video-based 
companion to the original.  Notably, the site awards “orchids” to news 
programs that do an exemplary job of covering ads and web videos, 
“stinkweeds” to those who “slip up in the their treatment of ads,” and 
“mixed bouquets” for those that do both.  The proliferation of cable news 
outlets offers numerous venues for scrutinizing ad claims.  Independent 
political groups flourish as well, some who engage advertising claims 
directly, including through counter-spots.   
Politifact’s finding that the Democratic charge that “Republicans 
voted to end Medicare” was the 2011 “Lie of the Year” offers much to 
recommend it, set against the standards suggested above. It targets a 
charge of wide relevance.  The very act of naming one “lie” above all 
others the lie of the year carries recognition that not all mendacity is 
created equal, though it may take this tack too far.  It is also at least 
arguably, if not definitively true, as Jamieson suggests, that Democratic 
exaggerations about Medicare and Social Security have for generations 
amounted to the longest running “Democratic deception” (Adair and 
Holan 2011).  Without explicitly saying so, character is joined, both in 
defense of the attacked and against the attacker.  Without question, 
“ending Medicare” is an incendiary charge, and when so many slightly 
modified alternative phrasings avail themselves, it is deliberately so.  
Candidates and parties should be called on that.  Yet the move also merits 
some important criticism.    
Politifact noted that the previous two annual “winners” also involved 
debate over health policy (in 2009, “death panels” and in 2010, the 
“government take over of health care”).   The Medicare charge would 
appear to have more in common with the latter than the former.  “Death 
panels,” one of social media maven Sarah Palin’s signature creations, was 
a whole cloth fabrication that 61 percent of the nearly 5,000 reader-
respondents to a poll commissioned by Politifact identified as “Lie of the 
Year.”  Some 44 percent of readers agreed with the 2010 choice.  Yet in 
2011, Politifact and its reader-respondents differed as to the “Lie of the 
Year.”  Readers voted the claim that the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), a.k.a. “the stimulus,” created no jobs 
as lie of the year; the Medicare claim finished third.    
Politifact reported that in 2011, for the first time, their poll became a 
target of fierce partisan combat, with both sides encouraging “voter” 
participation.   Perhaps this is not only to be expected, but indicative of 
the flaw not in the partisans but in the judgment itself, or at least its 
sweeping nature.  Exactly what purpose is served by designating a single 
“Lie of the Year?”  Isn’t there more than enough mendacity to warrant 
multiple awards?  It is hard enough to resolve matters of bitter partisan 
dispute on their own merits.  It is that much harder when attempting to 
draw from the cacophony of campaign talk a single offense above all 
others based a single dimension, “lying.” 
The Democratic transgression does not represent a claim unsupported 
by evidence or contrary to established knowledge.  It   is rather one of 
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nomenclature.  The Politifact judgment essentially rests on the argument 
that in privatizing Medicare (by providing premium support or vouchers), 
the Ryan/G.O.P. plan did not end Medicare since there would still be a 
program called Medicare.  Had the Democrats and others only said “end 
Medicare as we know it,” they would have avoided the opprobrium, 
Politifact acknowledged in reviewing the charge when made by Senator 
Sherrod Brown of Ohio (Politifact 2011a).  This, however, is a rather 
slender distinction upon which to base such a freighted judgment as “Lie 
of the Year.”  Politifact acknowledged that costs to seniors would leap 
from 25 percent of expenses to 68 percent under the Ryan plan, and that 
the Republican approach amounted to “fundamental change” by replacing 
an entitlement with “premium support.”   
Politifact maintains this is a difference in degree and not of kind, but 
reasonable minds may quibble.  One could argue that nearly trebling the 
share of costs born by seniors (and concomitantly reducing the share born 
by Medicare by two-thirds) renders the “end Medicare charge” 
mathematically closer to the truth than “keeping Medicare” as it is would 
be.  What if 99 percent of expenses were to be born by seniors?  Would it 
still be Medicare then?   
For Politifact, “ending” Medicare means zero Medicare or no program 
called Medicare.  Anything less is false. Zero jobs from the ARRA means 
zero jobs.  Any non-zero job gain falsifies the statement.  While there is a 
superficial certitude and clarity to this approach, it appears ill-suited to 
engage political discourse where the meaning of language itself and the 
uncertain consequences of policy are both highly contested.   Rather than 
helping voters put the pieces of the puzzle together, this micro-
semanticism cuts the pieces up into ever smaller slivers, running the risk 
of losing the political forest for the linguistic trees. 
Consider Politifact’s (2012)  rating of a Mitt Romney campaign 
mailer’s charge that “Since the passage of Obama's stimulus package, over 
1 million additional jobs were lost and nearly 25 million Americans are 
out of work, are stuck in part-time work, or have given up looking,” as 
“half-true.”  The designation is literally true but it does not seem to 
meaningfully describe the significance of what Politifact’s own analysis 
points to.  The first eleven paragraphs of the story essentially “bear out” 
Romney’s claims.   Before the ARRA, there were 132.8 million jobs, after 
131.7 million.  Only then does the article pose the question, “is Obama to 
blame?”  The next ten paragraphs present overwhelming evidence that 
the ARRA produced millions of jobs, with independent estimates ranging 
from 1.3 to as many as 2.5 million jobs created or saved.  The implicit 
priority of the piece seems skewed.  No one is contesting the employment 
data.  The political question (raised by the Romney charge) is what it 
means, and more specifically what the president’s policies have or have 
not accomplished.  To be fair, Politifact also gave a statement from a 
National Republican Senatorial Committee ad that the stimulus created 
“zero jobs” its “pants-on-fire” designation for full-throated dishonesty 
(Politifact 2011b).  There has to be some better way to properly 
distinguish among such claims if the project is to be more useful.   
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At its worst, the fundamental problem with Politifact is that all too 
often it becomes bogged down in virtually meaningless definitional 
minutiae used to justify stark assessments of mendacity.  In emphasizing 
literalism, the site’s journalists fail to clarify fundamental political issues 
while at the same time criminalizing robust political debate.   In 2012, the 
site rated an MSNBC promotional ad “mostly false” for claiming that 
critics of the GI Bill (passed in June of 1944) called it “welfare.”   In their 
analysis, Politifact noted that critics of the bill likened it to “the bane of 
the British Empire, … the dole system,” claimed it would reward “the lazy 
and ‘chisely’ types of veterans,” described it as more of a “relief” act than 
an educational one, and that the president of the University of Chicago, 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, warned that colleges and universities would 
be converted into “hobo jungles.”  But, as the scholars quoted by Politifact 
duly noted, it would be “incorrect to say the critics called the proposal 
welfare.”  This toxic literalism serves no positive purpose.   
Now consider Politifact’s take on MSNBC host Rachel Maddow’s 
claims about the budget situation in Wisconsin.  In February, 2011, the 
site rated Maddow’s statement that Wisconsin had a projected budget 
surplus “false.”  Politifact acknowledged that a memo prepared by the 
director of Wisconsin’s nonpartisan Legislative Fiscal Bureau stated “a 
general fund gross balance of $121.4 million and a net balance of $56.4 
million.”  The site claimed, however, that “unpaid bills” and “expected 
shortfalls in programs” meant the budget was actually in deficit.  Politifact 
does not state, however, whether the overdue bills and projected 
shortfalls are actually part of the budget.  What happened to Politifact’s 
characteristic literalism?  The piece quotes the memo’s author as saying 
he didn’t want “to presume what legislative or other action will be taken 
to address the potential shortfalls” (emphasis added).  More to the point, 
the central claim in Maddow’s piece was not that the budget was balanced 
(indeed she notes the very same deficit number Politifact relies upon, 
albeit linking it suggestively with the size of corporate tax breaks intiated 
by Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker that Politifact points out will not 
take effect until the following biennial budget).  Rather, it was that 
budgetary constraints did not justify the anti-union legislation Wisconsin 
was moving to adopt.  In addition to the budget memo, Maddow pointed 
out that the budget included other new provisions that would swell the 
deficit.  For better or worse, the argument that the Wisconsin collective 
bargaining measures represented a partisan attack on the opposition base 
and not fiscal necessity is not the type of claim Politifact typically engages 
and it did not do son in connection with the Maddow piece. Politifact may 
be right, but only by training its vision so narrowly as to miss the true 
bone of contention. 
Perhaps some progress can be made through a more explicit 
taxonomy of deceptions, distortions and lies. Some transgressions involve 
statements found to run contrary to the preponderance of evidence, for 
example claims denying climate change or evolution, or suggesting that 
preventative care saves money.  Other claims could be categorized as 
misstatements of an opponent’s position.  Some might represent 
emotionally “loaded” language (such as “ending Medicare”).  Others 
represent technical distortions, such as those using audiovisual editing to 
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create false impressions.  As noted above, some can be seen as policy 
disagreements, while other charges, ostensibly couched as policy, truly 
function more as character assaults. In short, the problem with the “lie of 
the year” approach is that it invites a summary judgment where a range of 
specifics would be more useful.  It is not just that the claim is distorted or 
false, but how so that requires elaboration. 
More can be done. By early 2012, Politifact had begun to offer a 
smartphone app with features including a running tally on candidates’ 
performance for the primary period.  Without some running tally or 
scoreboard, candidates or groups may find little deterrence in 
condemnatory ad watches, but a simple total may not provide viewers 
sufficient information.  The sheer profusion of advertising and 
communications claims make it inevitable that even severe infractions 
may blend into the cacophony of the campaign.  Politifact’s website is 
already bloated with dozens of individual analyses, presumably presented 
chronologically, leaving visitors to the site to guess as to what is really 
important as opposed to most recent (though one is reticent to fault 
journalists who by definition traffic in the present for failing to re-process 
the past). 
The sports pages may offer a useful model for the fact checkers.  
There, for any given sport, one often finds several different categories of 
“league leaders.”  Or better yet, the Academy Awards ceremony with its 
many categories.  The latter model could naturally accommodate 
audiovisual production values and evocation of popular cultural forms 
commonly found in ads like horror, satire, and biography. It could include 
a categories related to various emotions such as fear. In including all 
manner of mistruth under the same umbrella, ad watch metrics run the 
risk of serious distortion.  It may be more useful to group transgressions 
by type, comparing candidates accordingly.  Simply “naming an award” 
for best (or worst) use of scare tactic or worst denial of the preponderance 
of evidence can also help educate readers about the different extant types 
of distortions and deceptions.  There is plenty enough mendacity to go 
around, it would seem, and there is no need to limit analysis to but a 
single metric.  
The Medicare charge falls into the category of definition and 
nomenclature.  The ARRA charge is an example of denial of the 
preponderance of evidence or a statement without evidence.  At the same 
time, the Medicare charge is a potentially emotionally brutal one aimed 
squarely at a broad swath of vulnerable voters.   
The ARRA charge is directed specifically at Barack Obama, or 
presumably sympathetic Democratic legislators and candidates.  It is an 
argument about the effectiveness of a policy overtly and implicitly a 
judgment of an impotent character or worse (corrupt). Indeed it 
represents a direct assault on Obama’s response to the greatest of the 
multitude of crises that confronted him, and is not without emotional 
baggage too.   
 Perhaps the most vexing challenge in building a better ad watch for 
the 21st century is engaging the way the audiovisual and narrative 
elements combine to present arguments spanning reason and emotion, 
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often blurring character and policy in the process.  As noted above, the 
audiovisual grammar developed by Jamieson’s team is primarily an 
audiovisual way of engaging textual argumentative claims.  It was not 
designed to engage audiovisual arguments.  Such an approach would be 
most welcome. 
This task does not seem one that the current institutional pillars of ad 
watch journalism are well-poised to take up.  There is much subjectivity 
in the kind of narrative and indeed mythic resonance of political 
advertising, a terrain many mainstream journalists remain reluctant to 
cross.  The technology and skills required to devise and deploy an 
audiovisual counter-arsenal, moreover, seem likely to escape  all of 
today’s ad watch avatars.   
One technique that can be used to counter the audiovisual evocation 
of culturally resonant communication is to break down the production 
into its component parts.  Nelson and Boynton (1997) “deconstruct” a 
campaign ad in this fashion, showing how audiovisual elements like 
black-and-white imagery, the howling of the wind and ominous music 
combine to communicate horror (see also Richardson 2003 for 
experimental construction of horror ads).  In 2012, FlackCheck.org 
created a prototypical attack ad taking quotes from Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address out of context to suggest that the 16th president had said 
Americans had “died in vain,” and that he believes that America will 
“perish from the earth.” 
 “Cable” news outlets such as MSBNC, Current TV, and Fox News 
Channel may turn out to be the most likely frontier for extending the next 
generation of ad watch praxis.  They may possess the technical, 
intellectual, and financial resources to pursue the project.  Yet they will 
not be alone.  Independent and partisan groups and even lone-wolf 
YouTube sensations now command noteworthy  capabilities and 
audience. 
The full array of ad watch combatants was on vivid display following 
the airing in late 2011 of a spot produced by GOP presidential candidate 
Mitt Romney titled, “Believe in America.” The ad shows President Obama 
saying, “if we keep talking about the economy, we’ll lose.”  The video clip 
in the Romney ad actually dated to 2008, and was edited to make it 
appear that Obama was speaking about his campaign, when in fact he had 
been quoting an aide to the McCain campaign.  TV analysts dutifully 
played the full quote, upbraiding the Romney team for deceitful and 
dishonest tactics.  Unsurprisingly, they often adopted much of the ad’s 
narrative and audiovisual framing even in critique, and some looped 
sound and images from the ad as background.  While roundly 
condemning the technical distortion of the ad, few if any challenged the 
underlying challenge to Obama’s economic record, which by that time had 
produced nearly two consecutive years of private sector job growth.   
Perhaps the most effective countermeasure, however, came from a 
counter ad, “Mitt Romney in His Own Words*,” produced by the advocacy 
group ThinkProgress, using the same technique the Romney ad had to 
make it appear that Romney had made outlandish statements, 
culminating in the asterisked punch line, “All quotes accurate by the 
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standards of Mitt Romney.” It, too was included in cable news stories 
about the campaign. It is closely akin to the type of thing The Daily Show 
with Jon Stewart excels at. 
There is, in short, no lack of participants in the struggle to contest 
questionable campaign communication. The success of fact-check 
journalism stands as notable example of the profession not only adapting 
but thriving in the face of accelerated change in communications 
technology. As we gaze into the future, we may expect that Ad Watch 3.0 
will be: interactive and communal (social), multimedia (audio, video, and 
hyperlink), multiargumentative (policy, metaphor, genre, myth, and 
character) and multicontested. Several specific reforms have been 
identified above, including taking audiovisuals much more seriously, 
addressing claims of character, more precisely quantifying the degree of 
misstatement, and producing a running tally or scoreboard across 
multiple categories of distortions and deceptions to offer a series of 
cumulative measures of a candidate's fidelity to the truth over the course 
of a campaign. 
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